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Abstract 
Danish municipalities have gone through a number of austerity-related govern-
ment initiatives with consequences for job levels and public services. Moreover, 
the ‘regulation mechanism’, which ties public sector wages to wage develop-
ment in the private sector, has worked as an indirect austerity measure leading 
to a quasi-pay freeze during the public sector collective bargaining rounds in 
2011 and 2013. It is difficult, however, to isolate crisis-related consequences 
from other factors such as demographic development, outsourcing and pre-crisis 
reform. Social dialogue has played a very limited role in relation to the direct 
austerity measures, though case studies show that social dialogue at the local 
level has played a role in the implementation of austerity and restructuring 
measures. In the education area, working time was removed from the local bar-
gaining agenda after a lock-out and government intervention in the 2013 bar-
gaining round, but beyond this area no major changes in social dialogue institu-
tions have taken place. 
 
Introduction 
Denmark entered the economic crisis in seemingly good condition with very 
low unemployment and years of stable growth. However, unemployment nearly 
tripled in the first years of the crisis and recovery has since been slower than in 
neighbouring countries such as Germany and Sweden. Nevertheless, the public 
sector and the public finances remain in relatively good condition, with a com-
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paratively low level of general government consolidated gross debt (47 per cent 
of GDP in 2011) and a low level of general public deficit (1.7 per cent of GDP)  
 
 
(Bach and Stroleny, 2013). Nevertheless, austerity measures with consequences  
for public sector job levels and social dialogue are not absent in Denmark. 
These consequences will be analysed in this article, focusing on three research 
questions: 
 How has the economic crisis affected municipalities and what austerity 
measures have been adopted? 
 How have these measures been implemented and to what extent has so-
cial dialogue contributed to the adjustment process at municipal level? 
 What are the outcomes of collective bargaining and employee participa-
tion activities in terms of changes in, first, the employment conditions 
of municipal employees, and, secondly, public services at local level? 
Following this introduction, the second section will provide some basic in-
formation about industrial relations in the public sector in Denmark with a spe-
cial view to the situation in municipalities. The third section presents various 
forms of austerity measures relevant for municipalities and the social partner 
role in these. The fourth section focuses on the local level, addressing the im-
pact of austerity measures on job levels, wages and working conditions, and 
social dialogue, as well as their impact on public services in municipalities. The 
conclusions are found in the fifth section. 
 
Background information on social dialogue institutions and 
municipalities 
Basics of the Danish public sector employment relations system 
Some 32 per cent of the Danish workforce is employed in the public sector. 
This comparatively high share has remained relatively stable over the past 20 
years despite increasing outsourcing (Ibsen et al., 2011). Public employees work 
within a three-tier public sector structure. 
In Denmark, the austerity measures and other responses to the crisis have 
been implemented through a public sector employment relations model charac-
terized by relatively limited legislation, bipartite collective agreements at all 
levels with high coverage rates, (ad hoc) tripartite social dialogue, an extensive 
system for employee involvement, and relatively strong trade unions. In model 
terms, the Danish public sector employment relations model comes closer to the 
‘model employer’ than the continental ‘sovereign employer’ (Bach and Bor-
dogna, 2011). In the latter, employment relations are unilaterally determined by 
the government, and collective bargaining is absent or severely restricted. In the 
former, the public sector is less isolated from conventional employment rela-
tions processes, such as collective bargaining, though the state poses an exam-
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ple to other employers. Research on the pre-crisis public sector has found that 
‘new public management’ (NPM) reforms have been introduced in Denmark, 
though these have been described as ‘moderate’ and as not having bypassed or 
sidelined trade unions (e.g. Ejersbo and Greve, 2005; Ibsen et al., 2011). 
The collective agreements cover wages and all issues of working and em-
ployment conditions, as well as a well-developed co-determination system. 
Social partners establish general wage scales and terms and conditions at an 
overall level (state, region or municipalities) which are then integrated into in-
dividual agreements for different occupations. However, wage reforms since the 
1990s have introduced local-level wage bargaining, allowing for individual or 
group supplements at the administrative unit/workplace. One important feature 
of the Danish employment relations model is the declining and limited number 
of civil servants with special statutory employment protection, with civil serv-
ants now generally covered by collective bargaining, not unilateral regulation 
(Due and Madsen, 2009). 
Regarding the levels and scope of bargaining, all three main bargaining lev-
els – state, regions (health) and municipalities – have a two-tier structure, 
whereby the first (highest) tier is subdivided in two. The most important part of 
the first tier is sector-level bargaining, normally taking place every second or 
third year. During these bargaining rounds state, regional and municipal em-
ployers respectively bargain with bargaining cartels (coalitions) made up of 
trade union representatives. The first tier also includes organizational bargain-
ing, which takes place more or less simultaneously with the sector-level bar-
gaining. Here the individual trade unions bargain themselves on all occupation-
specific wage components, pensions and working conditions within a set finan-
cial framework. Moreover, the development of various projects is often agreed 
at this level. In times of tight budgets, there is often very little to bargain on at 
this level. The local level is the second bargaining level, and has gained in im-
portance due to partial decentralization (Hansen, 2011). As a general rule it is a 
trade union-related shop steward who does the bargaining, with issues including 
wages, working time, training and policies for senior employees. 
Regarding coverage, collective agreements cover no fewer than 98 per cent 
of employees in the state sector. The remaining 2 per cent represents employees 
with individual contracts or whose pay and conditions are unilaterally regulated 
by legislation (Due and Madsen, 2009: 360). No statistics exist for the regional 
and municipal sectors, but collective bargaining coverage is estimated to be at 
least as high as in the state sector. 
These high percentages do not imply, however, that collective agreements 
are the sole form of regulating pay and conditions. Legislation plays a role, 
most importantly when it comes to employment conditions (terms of notice, 
etc.), annual leave allowances, leave of absence due to childbirth and working 
environment issues. Moreover, in the higher parts of the job hierarchy individu-
al agreements supplementing collective agreements are widespread. 
Two other forms of social dialogue are worth mentioning in connection with 
public sector employment relations. One is ad hoc tripartite social dialogue, 
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which also involves social partners from the public sector, while the other is the 
co-determination system, including co-determination committees at all levels. 
Key features of the municipalities 
Responsibilities for the three main areas of public services were changed by the 
so-called Structural Reform of 2007, under which 273 municipalities were 
amalgamated into 98, and 14 counties eliminated, being replaced by five re-
gions with a narrow range of responsibilities. The reform’s aim was to create 
economies of scale and to improve welfare services by reshuffling the division 
of responsibilities between the three main areas. The municipalities were a net 
gainer of the reform, with their responsibilities now encompassing – in order of 
budget size – schools; day care; care of the elderly; administration; the disabled; 
other services; children and young people with special needs; the environment, 
traffic, etc.; health. 
The number of employees in the municipal sector is 443,000, and there are 
122,000 employees in the regional sector and 183,000 in the state sector (Statis-
tics Denmark, 2012). Hence, the municipal sector is by far the largest employer 
of the three. Danish municipalities also play a major financial role in compara-
tive terms. Measured as a percentage of GDP, local government expenditure in 
Denmark is 37 per cent, more than three times the EU average (Bach and Stro-
leny, 2013). 
The subcontracting of public services is possible in the majority of public 
service areas and is used to a large extent. KL, the interest organization of Dan-
ish municipalities, agreed in 2007 that 25 per cent of municipal public services 
(of the services it is legally possible to subcontract) should be ‘exposed to com-
petition’, meaning that they should be contracted out, but that it would also be 
possible for the municipality itself to put in a bid. A non-binding target was set 
in 2011 aimed at increasing the share to 31.5 per cent. In 2011, 25 per cent of 
all municipal public services legally possible to subcontract were exposed to 
competition. In the municipal sector, the de facto volume of services subcon-
tracted to private providers reached 24.9 per cent in 2011 (Økonomi- og inden-
rigsministeriet, 2013). It is worth noting that the level of outsourcing (measured 
as the percentage of spending on services exposed to competition) remained the 
same before and after the crisis. As indicated in Table 1, exposure to competi-
tion increased substantially, but this occurred before the crisis and was a reac-
tion to a political demand to increase exposure in connection with the Structural 
Reform. 
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Austerity measures relevant for municipalities 
This section looks at austerity measures pertaining to municipalities. Some are 
‘direct’ in the sense that they explicitly aim to reduce public spending whereas 
others are ‘indirect’ in that they do not explicitly aim to cut public spending, 
though this nevertheless occurs as a consequence thereof. Since the terms ‘aus-
terity’ and ‘austerity measures’ are not accurate in all cases, other terms such as 
‘crisis-related policies’ are also used. 
 
Crisis-related policies and the role of the social partners 
The liberal-conservative government in power from November 2001 until Sep-
tember 2011 initially responded to the crisis in 2008 by introducing stimulus 
packages and bank packages. These packages were followed by budget cuts and 
welfare reforms combining austerity measures with measures to increase labour 
supply in the long term. The liberal-conservative government’s main policy 
response to the crisis of relevance to municipalities was the 2010 Recovery Plan 
(including unemployment benefit reform). The Plan was implemented inter 
alia via the 2010 and 2011 budgets and was the first real austerity measure. It 
postponed some of the tax reductions foreseen in the 2009 tax reform; intro-
duced a 0.5 per cent spending cut for all ministry budgets; introduced a ceiling 
on tax reductions for unemployment insurance contributions; and included an 
unemployment benefit reform reducing the maximum unemployment benefit 
period from four to two years. 
In 2011, municipal budget cuts – as a result of the Recovery Plan – totalled 
€0.6bn. KL has shown that 20 per cent of municipalities experienced cuts in 
their budget of 4 per cent or more between 2009 and 2011 (KL, 2011). 
The Social Democrat-led centre-left government that came into office in 
September 2011 continued the tight budget policy, but also introduced 
a stimulus package (‘Kickstart’) for 2012–2013. The aim here was to stimulate 
the economy by investing €2.3bn in public infrastructure and other public 
spending measures in 2012 and 2013. The package was part of the 2012 and 
2013 budgets. The aims of improving public finances and increasing labour 
demand are found in the government initiatives included in their ‘2020 Plan’ 
(Regeringen, 2012). This was also the case for the (failed) tripartite negotia-
tions. The social partners and the government conducted tripartite talks in late 
May and early June 2012 with the aim of reaching agreement on improving 
competitiveness, growth and employment. More specifically, the aim was to 
create 20,000 new jobs and improve public finances by €0.5bn. However, the 
talks broke down mainly due to trade union disapproval of increasing working 
time. Trade unions found it difficult to explain to their members why labour 
supply should be increased in times of relatively high unemployment. Another 
important example of the combined aim included in the 2020 Plan was 
the reform of disability pensions and flex-job scheme 1 in line with a proposal 
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put forward by the previous government. The reforms virtually block access to 
disability pensions for people under 40, reduce wage subsidies for high-income 
flexi-jobbers and introduce new ways to support the disabled to return to the 
regular labour market. Estimated savings of €0.3bn per year are expected to be 
achieved when fully implemented. 
More exclusively related to the public sector is the 2020 Plan’s section on 
Modernizing the public sector. Here, the government calls for greater use to be 
made of performance measurement, management by results and evaluations. 
Furthermore, the government calls for initiatives to streamline work processes 
and eliminate unnecessary tasks. One of the aims is to show more ‘trust’ in pub-
lic sector employees, enabling them to focus more on core tasks and less on 
reporting. However, a possible clash between this aim and the aim to increase 
the use of evaluation and measurement by results has been pointed to. Other 
relevant measures include the call to increase working hours in general (part-
time work is very widespread in the public sector) and in education in particular 
(see below for how this aim was fulfilled). 
Also directly related to the public sector is another plan, ‘Growth Plan DK – 
Strong companies, more jobs’ (Regeringen, 2013). In the plan, the government 
states that it will ‘set free’ €1.6bn in the public sector for ‘new initiatives’ and 
‘targeted improvements in the public sector’. Furthermore, the government will 
aim for ‘balanced growth’ in the public sector of between 0.4 and 1.0 per cent 
per year until 2020. Certain public sector trade unions see the sum of these for-
mulations and calculations as de facto austerity, leading to them refusing to 
cooperate with the government (also because of the 2013 bargaining round de-
scribed below), whereas other unions do not see any dramatic measures here 
and are willing to cooperate. No matter which of these interpretations is right, it 
is clear the public sector collective bargaining system will increasingly be lev-
eraged to make the public sector more efficient (Mailand, 2013). 
Regarding the role of the social partners, the failed tripartite negotiations in 
2012 were the only above-mentioned government initiative where trade unions 
were more than superficially involved. Some of the other policies – not least the 
unemployment benefit reform and the reform of the voluntary early retirement 
scheme – were even introduced by the previous liberal-conservative govern-
ment despite strong protests from the trade unions. This lack of involvement of 
(both) social partners has also been seen in relation to other work- and employ-
ment-related initiatives. There seems to be a trend towards de-corporatization, 
despite a three-year period (2004–2007) under the same liberal-conservative 
government when the social partners enjoyed a certain amount of involvement 
(Mailand, 2011). Nevertheless, the relation between the government and the 
private sector employers’ organizations – especially the powerful Danish Indus-
try (DI) – seems to be strong. 
In terms of trade union reactions, there have – apart from protests aired in 
the media – been a number of protests, including a one-day large-scale protest 
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demonstration on 8 June 2010, organized by the largest Danish trade union con-
federation (LO) and a number of their member organizations. But in general, 
demonstrations and other forms of protest have been few in numbers – and there 
have not been any general strikes. 
 
The annual Financial Agreements – indirect austerity measures? 
Apart from the national crisis-related policies described above, two other types 
of regulation include elements of austerity for local government. The first are 
the annual Financial Agreements (‘økonomiaftale’) negotiated between the 
government (Ministry of Finance) and the KL (column 2 in Table 2). Munici-
pality compliance with the agreement is controlled by the government in two 
rounds. First, with regard to the extent to which municipalities respect the Fi-
nancial Agreement in their budgets (planned spending, column 3 in Table 2), 
which are finalized in June each year. Secondly, it is controlled through annual 
accounts (i.e. de facto spending reported early in the following year, column 4 
in Table 2) having to remain within the limits of the Financial Agreements. 
Non-compliance with the budget has consequences for the financial resources 
allocated to the municipalities the following year. These sanctions have been 
gradually tightened since 2009. From 2013 the control and sanctions are not 
only collective: 60 per cent of the cuts in financial resources allocated will only 
apply to municipalities which have overspent (Birkvad, 2013). 
 
 
 
Within this financial framework municipalities have extensive freedom to set 
their own priorities. Although Financial Agreements are specified for individual 
municipalities, certain municipalities are allowed to spend more if others spend 
less, as it is the aggregate level that counts, although the 2013 amendment has 
introduced an individual component to the sanctions. 
These features reflect the relative autonomy of a municipality which – de-
spite centralization in recent years – still applies in many regards. The autono-
my includes the right to set municipal taxes, accounting for more than 50 per 
cent of municipal revenues. The responsibility deriving from this tax system 
provides incentives for individual municipalities not to run deficits. 
The development in the Financial Agreements, the total budgets of munici-
palities and their annual accounts in recent years are shown in Table 2. The 
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table shows varying, but modest increases in the Financial Agreements in the 
years following the economic crisis when measured in nominal prices (financial 
resources not adjusted for inflation). However, regarding public services in real 
prices (financial resources adjusted for inflation, not shown in the table) this 
represents a 4 per cent reduction from 2009 to 2012. In real terms the reduction 
in the budget for public services is 5 per cent for 2009–2011 and 10 per cent for 
the annual accounts for the same period (using the Statistics Denmark price 
index). 
Moreover, the table shows that the Financial Agreements for 2013 for the 
first time provided for declining financial resources (in nominal terms) for pub-
lic services. It can also be seen that municipalities planned to spend substantial-
ly less on public services in 2011 and 2012 than they were allowed to under the 
Financial Agreement, but ended up spending even less than budgeted on public 
services. There are several possible explanations for this ‘self-imposed austeri-
ty’. First, it might simply indicate that municipalities had learned from the cri-
sis, increasing – with the help of KL – the attention paid to overspending, wide-
spread until a few years ago. Secondly, it might be that the government simply 
did not know how bad the financial situation in municipalities had been and 
therefore had allowed them to spend more money than they should (Ugebrevet 
A4, September 10, 2012). Thirdly, tightening sanctions might have worked. 
No matter which of the explanations is right, the government has over the 
last two years taken the unusual step of asking municipalities to spend more. 
The message seems to have come across in that the total municipal budget for 
public services in 2013 ended up much closer to the Financial Agreement 
(OAO, 2012). 
 
The 2011 and 2013 bargaining rounds – another form of indirect austerity 
measures?  
Apart from direct reactions to the government’s austerity measures and other 
crisis-related policies, one reaction has a lot to do with the renewal of the sec-
tor-level collective agreements. The results of the public sector collective bar-
gaining round in 2011 – that took place when job cuts were expected, but most-
ly still not implemented – were very meagre from a trade union perspective. 
With regard to wages, the outcome was a wage freeze for 2011 and very limited 
wage increases in 2012 in all three main sectors. To some extent this was ex-
pected due to the economic context and the so-called ‘regulation mechanism’, 
which ties public sector wages to wage development in the private sector, alt-
hough with a certain delay. In a rare situation, as the present, where economic 
conditions went from very favourable to very unfavourable within a very short 
period, the ‘regulation mechanism’ has worked as a hidden austerity measure. 
Apart from the agreement on wages (which also implied that no national-
level financial resources were allocated for local wage setting), the result in-
cluded, inter alia, the flexibilization of the central co-determination commit-
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tees’ agendas, increased job security for shop stewards, and – in the agreement 
for municipalities – a security fund for certain employees made redundant. 
Trade unions were only able to push through a limited number of their de-
mands. Nevertheless, it can be argued that they succeeded in blocking the em-
ployers’ aims regarding, e.g. increasing the share of wages set at local level, 
increased working time, and a movement from collective to individual bargain-
ing at local level. Most trade unions had expected some kind of compensation in 
the form of job, employment or income security or other benefits in exchange 
for the wage restraint. However, all union demands for greater job security (e.g. 
prolonged terms of notice, redundancy payments) were rejected. These demands 
were clearly related to the crisis and the increasing number of redundancies in 
the public sector, and were inspired by similar agreements concluded in the 
private sector in 2010. However, in the municipal sector KL came up with the 
proposal at the very end of negotiations for a ‘security fund’ to finance further 
training for workers made redundant as a kind of compensation for all the re-
jected demands. 
In sum, the outcome of the 2011 bargaining round was not very dramatic. 
Although employers took advantage of their enhanced bargaining power and 
acted tougher than usual, the bargaining round did not lead to any dramatic 
changes. 
Between the 2011 and the 2013 bargaining rounds there were mixed signs 
on the development of social dialogue. On the one hand, there was increasing 
pressure on KL from the Ministry of Finance, some of the larger municipalities 
and other stakeholders to act ‘tougher’ and emphasize the management preroga-
tive. These actors had long seen KL as too willing to compromise with trade 
unions. The crisis was seen as a not-to-be missed opportunity to change this 
approach. On the other hand, the period showed that the public sector social 
partners could still take new joint initiatives. Hence, in winter 2011–2012 the 
social partners in the municipal sector defined four topics to be discussed in the 
period prior to the 2013 collective bargaining round, preparing them in working 
groups. The four topics were labour supply, skill development/further training, 
quality and job content, and the inclusive labour market. 
It was, however, the first-mentioned signs that gave the best indication of 
what was about to happen. The 2013 bargaining round became unusually con-
flict-prone, at least in some bargaining areas. Among state employers – the de 
facto trendsetters in public sector collective bargaining – a key demand for the 
2013 bargaining round was the termination of the ‘regulation mechanism’ in 
order to decouple the public sector from private sector wage developments and 
instead link to them to productivity. The trade unions feared that this could lead 
to reductions in nominal wages. At the end of the day, the regulation mecha-
nism remained in place – at least in this round. The general agreement in the 
state sector included very limited wage increases and few other changes. Since 
bargaining in the municipal sector increasingly takes place in the ‘shadow of the 
  
   
10 
state’ – a shadow secured through informal coordination between the state and 
the municipal employers and the timing of the negotiations in the two areas – 
municipal negotiators were not left much room for manoeuvre. 
Another noteworthy employer demand was the termination of all existing lo-
cal agreements on working time for teachers in schools (children up to the age 
of 15) (municipal employers’ demands) and in most post-15 education institu-
tions (state employers’ demand) in order to strengthen management prerogative 
and to facilitate and finance a large-scale reform of schools. After failed arbitra-
tion, a three and a half week lock-out without a prior call for strikes3 and – fi-
nally – government intervention by law, the employers’ demand was met. This 
process has been described by some public sector trade unions as violating the 
self-governing principle of the Danish employment relations model, with them 
criticizing the dual role of the Minister of Finance as chief negotiator and legis-
lator and accusing the Ministry of Finance and KL of having intentionally ar-
ranged the whole process for it to end with state intervention. Among trade un-
ions these events have become a cause of concern for coming public sector col-
lective bargaining rounds. They wonder whether lock-outs without prior calls to 
strike will be used again – or whether this was a one-off event caused by educa-
tion becoming high politics and by the inclusion of local-level bargaining rights 
unseen in other parts of the public sector. 
Apart from this conflict over teachers’ working hours, the bargaining round 
in the municipal sector, as in the state sector, was not very dramatic. No agree-
ment was reached on a number of controversial KL demands, such as reducing 
the number of shop stewards, changing the special rules for employees older 
than 60 and flexibilizing working time rules. Similarly, a number of trade union 
demands were rejected, including an extension of paternity leave and greater 
employment security. Again the result was a quasi-wage freeze4 and few other 
minor changes. 
Impact of austerity measures in municipalities 
Variations in municipal budget-cutting programmes and consequences 
for job levels 
Though budgets were cut in most municipalities, it is important to emphasize 
how these cuts varied between different municipalities, as seen in the figures for 
2009–2012: 
 seven municipalities experienced service budget cuts of more than 7 per 
cent; 
 18 faced 5–7 per cent service budget cuts; 
 50 faced 2–5 per cent cuts; 
 19 experienced 0–2 per cent cuts; 
 four municipalities increased service budgets (KL Momentum, 14 Febru-
ary, 2012). 
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One conclusion from these figures is that most municipalities avoided – on 
average across welfare areas – the dramatic cuts seen in other EU Member 
States. 
Regarding the impact on employment levels, there is no doubt that the crisis-
related policies contributed to declining levels. Public sector employment 
peaked in 2Q 2010 at 842,000 employees. Net job losses reached 18,000 (2.1 
per cent) in 3Q 2011, bringing public sector employment down to 824,000 
(AE Rådet, 2011). Compared to similar developments in many other EU coun-
tries, this reduction in public sector employment was fairly limited, hardly hav-
ing an impact on the situation where 30 per cent of the total Danish workforce 
work in the public sector. 
 
Consequences for pay, working conditions, social dialogue and public 
service – case studies 
At local level, the tight budgets combined with the meagre outcomes of the 
2011 and 2013 collective bargaining rounds severely restrained local wage de-
velopment, even though local wage bargaining had been conducted to a limited 
extent over the last few years. Progress towards achieving the government’s aim 
of increasing the share of wages set at local level had more or less stalled. 
The following two municipal case studies highlight how the crisis interacted 
with other structural factors (such as the 2007 Structural Reform and demo-
graphic developments) and the role of local-level social partners in addressing 
the crisis.5 Both case studies focus on schools, one of the biggest areas of mu-
nicipal responsibility. 
The 4.8 per cent cut in the service budget of Mariagerfjord Kommune for 
2009–2011 contributed to a 2.5 per cent reduction in municipal headcount. A 
few months after the annual budget negotiations for 2010 closed, they were 
reopened to allow for further cuts. Though the municipality’s co-determination 
committees – at various levels – were involved in the processes of making cuts, 
their timing was a matter of controversy, with representatives calling for earlier 
involvement in order to have a real opportunity to put forward proposals for 
rationalization and cuts (Hovedudvalg, 2009). 
The school budget suffered only minor cuts when four municipalities were 
amalgamated into Mariagerfjord Kommune in 2007. However, when the 2010 
budget was reopened, it was decided that the school budget should be cut by 4 
per cent (DKK 15m, €2m) and that 10 of the 18 schools should be closed. This 
decision was influenced by demographics, a teaching philosophy supporting 
larger units, and the tighter budget. The new school structure implied a further 4 
per cent budget reduction which, together with additional cuts, brought the 
(permanent) reduction in the school budget up to 10 per cent. The cuts were 
gradually implemented in 2010 and 2011. 
Furthermore, in 2011 a local agreement between the municipality and the lo-
cal trade unions on teachers working time was concluded. In brief, the agree-
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ment included budget cuts and work intensification, as well as the allocation of 
financial resources for further training to help limit redundancies (see below). 
When the budget was reopened in 2009 the municipality’s school unit con-
tacted the trade unions to discuss what action could be taken to limit the number 
of redundancies and to implement the necessary dismissals as correctly and 
gently as possible. The school unit suggested a scheme including either a sever-
ance payment of a few months (not normal practice in the sector) or an increase 
in pensions (of around €70 per month). The scheme targeted employees close to 
retirement. The trade unions agreed to limit their demands for severance pay-
ments in order to limit the number of redundancies. Teacher uptake of the 
scheme was high and 65 older employees signed up for it – more than 10 per 
cent of all employees. 
Moreover, ‘job bank’ arrangements were established. In some cases, these 
included a guarantee that persons made redundant would be offered a new job 
(temporary or open-ended) in the case of vacancies, insofar as they possessed 
the right formal qualifications. For other groups the arrangement only involved 
a guaranteed job interview in the case of vacancies. 
Finally, a job rotation project was introduced in 2012. As a result of the re-
structuring which had led to fewer and larger schools, a larger number of teach-
ers were sent on further training courses. The financial resources for these 
courses were provided by the working time agreement mentioned above. The 
job rotation project helped reduce the number of vacancies. 
Silkeborg Kommune is one of the municipalities that faced the largest cuts in 
its service budget. In early 2010, liquidity was so low that the municipality was 
in danger of being put under the financial administration of the Ministry of In-
ternal Affairs. This situation was linked first to the fact that water supply assets 
had been ‘removed’ from the municipal balance sheet on privatization, and sec-
ondly to higher-than-expected expenditure on the disabled, an area for which 
municipalities had become responsible as part of the Structural Reform. To get 
the local economy back on the right track the city council agreed to reduce the 
2011 budget by DKK 250m (€33.5m). A hiring freeze was introduced and the 
selection of employees to be made redundant started in spring 2010. 
The local trade unions were involved in the process of cuts through the Cen-
tral Co-determination Committee (HovedMED), attending meetings in which 
participants were informed of the reasons for the city council’s decision to re-
duce the budget and given the opportunity to influence the general guidelines 
for the redundancies. The common aim of the social partners was to maximize 
the share of redundancies that could take place in the form of so-called ‘natural 
wastage’, i.e. retirements, employees moving to jobs outside the municipality 
and not being replaced, temporary positions not replaced by new temporary 
positions, etc. 
Contrary to the way redundancies were dealt with in Mariagerfjord Kom-
mune, no severance payments, extra pensions or other ‘baits’ were used, with 
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both the employer and trade unions in agreement that the number of redundan-
cies should not be increased by increasing the cost of each redundancy. The cuts 
led to a reduction in the number of employees in the municipality. 
Regarding cuts in the school area, it should be noted that the demographic 
development in this municipality was no problem, as the number of school-age 
children had remained stable for some years. The city council’s Committee for 
Children and Young People nevertheless decided to cut the school budget by 
DKK 65m (€8.7m), to be implemented gradually during 2011 and 2012. On top 
of this, further cuts for 2013 of DKK 13m (€1.7m) were decided, bringing the 
total reduction up to approximately 10 per cent of the budget compared to its 
2010 level. 
In the school area, trade union involvement took place both through the Lo-
cal Co-determination Committees and more informally through contacts involv-
ing the school unit in the municipality and the trade unions. The common aim of 
the social partners here as well was to maximize the share of ‘natural wastage’ 
redundancies, with more than 50 per cent taking this form in the school area. 
Actual redundancies were reduced to little fewer than 50 persons. 
In connection with the redundancies job banks were also established, cover-
ing not just schools but the whole municipality. They gave former employees 
(made redundant in 2010 and 2011) privileged access to new permanent and 
temporary jobs before commencement of open recruitment. The job banks in 
Silkeborg Kommune included no job or job interview guarantee. Even so, they 
saved the jobs of a few employees who had already received their notice. 
Finally, a job rotation scheme covering all municipality teachers was initiat-
ed in 2011 to make schools more ‘inclusive’, i.e. equip them better to include 
pupils with various forms of learning problems. Some 1400 teachers were sent 
on a one-week course, and 150 on a six-week course. The courses created tem-
porary job openings – equal to 24 full-time positions for one year – offered to 
unemployed teachers through the local job centre. 
In sum, these two case studies demonstrate that the impact of the crisis at 
municipal level is mixed with other causal factors. Furthermore, the two studies 
illustrate that the social partners (de facto the trade unions) can play a construc-
tive role in implementing redundancies in local authorities. They also reveal the 
beneficial use of such tools as (limited) remunerations and supplementary pen-
sions, natural wastage, job banks and job rotation schemes. They stress the im-
portance of open attitudes, early trade union involvement and clear divisions of 
labour and time schedules to minimize the damage caused by redundancies.6 
As to the consequences of social dialogue for public services – addressed in 
the third research question – the case studies indicate that the public service 
itself is not a subject dealt with directly in local-level social dialogue institu-
tions. However, in the case studies local-level social dialogue played a role in 
implementing austerity and restructuring measures, in some cases reducing their 
negative consequences. Even so, the decisions to introduce local-level austerity 
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and restructuring measures were taken beforehand and in decision-making bod-
ies other than those where social dialogue takes place. 
 
Summary and conclusions 
This article has analysed austerity measures and other crisis-related policies in 
Denmark, looking at the role of the social dialogue and the policies’ impact on 
municipalities. Regarding the first research question it was argued that, alt-
hough a number of crisis-related government initiatives could be considered to 
contain austerity elements, these typically also had other aims (e.g. increasing 
labour supply). Moreover, it is disputable whether the high-profile government 
plans actually set forth austerity targets in relation to the public sector. Austerity 
is found in the annual Financial Agreements between the government and the 
interest organization of the municipalities (KL). In real prices – but not in nom-
inal prices – these agreements imply that municipalities should spend less than 
before the crisis, although the change is small. However, municipalities have in 
recent years chosen to spend less than allowed by the Agreements, thereby in-
creasing the consequences for employment and public services. Indirect austeri-
ty is found in the public sector collective bargaining rounds of 2011 and 2013 
where the ‘regulation mechanism’, which ties public sector wages to wage de-
velopment in the private sector, led to pay agreements close to pay freezes. 
From a comparative perspective, however, all these plans, policies, initiatives 
and agreements are not very dramatic. 
Furthermore, it was argued that, when estimating the impact of the crisis on 
municipalities, it is difficult to separate this impact from other factors such as 
demographic developments, digitalization, outsourcing and the reform of the 
sub-national governance structure (the 2004–2007 Structural Reform). The cri-
sis and these additional drivers have led to a drop in public sector employment 
and indirect pressure on wages and working conditions. 
Regarding the second research question, the analyses show that social dia-
logue has played a very limited role in relation to the direct austerity measures, 
whereas the dialogue was of importance for the indirect austerity measures (the 
collective bargaining rounds). Both the 2011 and the 2013 rounds resulted in 
quasi-wage freezes, few benefits for employees and few other changes. An im-
portant exception to this general pattern was the education area, where the trade 
unions – after conciliation attempts, lock-out and intervention by law – lost their 
right in 2013 to negotiate on the use of working time. This process and its out-
come have led to concern in some trade unions over the future of the collective 
bargaining-based Danish employment relations model. At local level social 
dialogue seems to have played a role in implementing the austerity and restruc-
turing measures. Furthermore, the dialogue has in some cases helped reduce the 
negative consequences of the crisis-related initiatives. However, the decisions to 
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introduce local-level austerity and restructuring measures are taken in advance 
and in decision-making bodies other than those involving the social partners. 
With regard to the third research question the article shows that although 
austerity measures and other crisis-related policies have had an impact on job 
levels, wages and working conditions, the impact is relatively limited. Regard-
ing the consequences of social dialogue for public services, the local-level case 
studies indicate that the local-level dialogue did not have any direct impact on 
the services, in that the public service itself is not a subject dealt with directly in 
local-level social dialogue institutions. However, social dialogue in the local-
level case studies did play a role in the implementation of austerity and restruc-
turing measures, in some cases reducing their negative consequences. 
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Notes 
1. The flex-job scheme features permanent wage-subsidized jobs on reduced 
hours and special conditions for disabled people. In 2011, 70,000 persons 
were employed in flex-jobs, half of them in the public sector. 
2. The source of the 2011 collective bargaining analysis is Mailand (2012). The 
sources of the analysis of the 2013 bargaining round are Mailand (2013) 
and interviews conducted in relation to an as yet unpublished project. 
3. A lock-out without a prior call for strike is very rare in public sector indus-
trial relations. In some countries, e.g. Portugal, it is not even legally possi-
ble for public sector employers to initiate a lock-out without a prior strike. 
4. As with the 2011 agreement, the 2013 agreement included very limited wage 
increases, though this time below the development in consumer prices, i.e. a 
reduction in real wages. 
5. The two cases were selected as municipalities hit by the crisis and where the 
social partners played important roles. Silkeborg Kommune experienced a 
7.1 per cent cut in the municipal service budget 2009–2012, whereas Ma-
riager Fjord Kommune witnessed a 4.8 per cent reduction in the same peri-
od. The sources of the case studies are telephone interviews with repre-
sentatives from trade unions and civil servants from the two municipalities 
as well as various reports and minutes. 
6. The findings from these cases studies with regard to the role of the social 
partners and importance of the Structural Reform as a driver are largely 
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confirmed by two other municipal case studies (Hansen and Mailand, 
2013). 
 
References 
AE Rådet (2011) Markant fald i antallet af offentligt ansatte. Copenhagen: AE- 
Rådet. 
Bach S, Bordogna L (2011) Varieties of new public management or alternative 
models? The reform of public service employment relations in industrial-
ized democracies. The International Journal of Human Resource Manage-
ment 22(11):2281–2294. 
Bach S, Stroleny A (2013) Social dialogue and the public services in the after-
math of the economic crisis: strengthening partnership in an era of austeri-
ty. London: King’s College. 
Birkvad F (2013) Rettidig omhu – en undersøgelse af kommunernes reaktion på 
ændrede økonomiske rammevilkår. CEPOS. Copenhagen: CEPOS Forla-
get. 
Due J, Madsen JS (2003) Fra magtkamp til konsensus – Arbejdsmarkedspen-
sionerne og den danske model. Copenhagen: Jurist og Økonomforbundets 
Forlag. 
Due J, Madsen JS (2009) Forligsmagere og Forumshoppere – analyse af OK08 i 
den offentlige sektor. Copenhagen: Jurist og Økonomforbundets Forlag. 
Ejersbo N, Greve C (2005) Moderniseringen af den offentlige 
sektor. Copenhagen: Børsens Forlag. 
Hansen NW (2011) Lokal løn i det offentlige. Fakta. FAOS, Sociologisk Insti-
tut, University of Copenhagen. 
Hansen NW (forthcoming). Samarbejde på den offentlige arbejdsplads under 
effektivisering. Et praksisstudie af det repræsentative samarbejde i MED-
systemet mellem ledelse og medarbejderrepræsentanter i danske kom-
muner. Ph.d.-afhandling. FAOS, Sociologisk Institut, University of Copen-
hagen. 
Hansen NW, Mailand M (2013) Public service employment relations in an era 
of austerity: The case of Denmark. European Journal of Industrial Rela-
tions. 19(4):375–389. 
Hovedudvalg (2009) Referat til møde i Hovedudvalg, MED, 21. oktober kl 
12:00. Hadsund, Mariagerfjord Kommune. 
Ibsen CL, Larsen TP, Madsen JS, Due J (2011) Challenging Scandinavian em-
ployment relations: the effects of new public management re-
forms. International Journal of Human Resource Manage-
ment 22(11): 2295–2310. 
Indenrigs- og Sundhedsministeriet (2006) Kommunalreformen – kort fortalt. 
Copenhagen: Indenrigs- og Sundhedsministeriet 
  
   
17 
KL (2011) Massive besparelser i kommunerne. Available at: 
http://www.kl.dk/Momentum/momentum2011-3-1-id83287/. (Accessed 14 
March 2011). 
Mailand M (2011) Trepartssamarbejdet gennem tiderne - hvordan, hvornår og 
hvilke udfordringer. FAOS, Sociologisk Institut, University of Copenha-
gen. 
Mailand M (2012) Overenskomstfornyelsen 2011 – den kommunale sektor per-
spektiveret. FAOS, Forskningsnotat no. 127. FAOS, Sociologisk Institut, 
University of Copenhagen. 
 Mailand M (2013) Arbejdsgivernes politik og adfærd, lønmodtagernes alli-
cancer og organisationsformer. FAOS Forskningsnotat no. 
135. FAOS, Sociologisk Institut, University of Copenhagen. 
OAO (2012) Økonomi aftalen mellem regeringen og kommunerne om 
2013.Available at: www.oao.dk. 
Regeringen (2012) Danmark i arbejde. Udfordringer for dansk økonomi frem 
mod 2020. Copenhagen: Regeringen. 
Regeringen (2013) Vækstplan DK - stærke virksomheder, flere 
job. Copenhagen: Regeringen. 
Statistics Denmark (2012) Beskæftigelsesfaldet i det offentlige fortsætter. Nyt 
fra Danmarks Statistik, 21. september 2012. 
Økonomi- og indenrigsministeriet (2013) Kommunale nøgletal. Available at: 
www.noegletal.dk 
 
Author biography 
Mikkel Mailand is associate professor and head of research at FAOS Employ-
ment Relations Research Centre, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. 
 
